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Plan Sésame (PS) was launched in 2006 to provide free access to health services 
to Senegalese citizens aged 60 and over. As in many countries, this user fee 
exemption is marred by inequitable implementation. This study seeks to identify 
underlying causal mechanisms to explain how and why some people were 
relatively less likely to have access to publicly funded health care. Explanations 
identified in focus group and interview data are organised into four themes: (i) 
PS as a poorly implemented and accessed “right” to health care; (ii) PS as a 
“privilege” reserved for elites; (iii) PS as a “favour” or moral obligation to friends 
or family members of health workers; and (iv) PS as a “curse” caused by adverse 
incorporation. These results are analysed through critical realist and social 
constructivist epistemological lenses, in order to reflect on different 
interpretations of causality. Within the critical realist interpretation, the results 
point to a process of social exclusion. However, this interpretation, with its 
emphasis on objective reality, is contradicted by some local, subjective 
experiences of inequality and corruption. An alternative social constructionist 
interpretation of the results is therefore explored; it is argued this may be 
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The struggle for universal health coverage 
 
It is now widely accepted that user fees for health care, introduced in many low 
and middle-income countries (LMIC) during structural adjustment in the 1980s 
and 1990s, increase poverty and reduce health care utilisation (World Health 
Organization 2010). In light of this, in 2005 World Health Organization (WHO) 
member states committed to achieving universal health coverage (UHC) to 
ensure that all people have access to quality needed health services and are 
protected from the financial hardships of health care costs (WHO 2005). This 
commitment has been reaffirmed by numerous reports, declarations and targets, 
including the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations General Assembly 
2012). Even the World Bank has backtracked on its policy of user charges, 
declaring in 2001 that ‘‘Out-of-pocket payments for health services – especially  
hospital care - can make the difference between an  household being poor or not’’ 
(Claeson, Griffin et al. 2001) and more recently that “Even tiny out-of-pocket 
charges can drastically reduce their use of needed services.  This is both unjust and 
unnecessary” (Kim 2013). However, although many LMIC have implemented 
financing mechanisms to initiate progress towards UHC, evidence on their 
effectiveness shows mixed results at best, with many studies indicating that 
many UHC policies have failed to reach their objectives (Spaan, Mathijssen et al. 
2012). 
 
Tax or donor-funded exemptions from user fees for health services for 
vulnerable groups (such as indigents) and priority interventions (such as 
maternal and child health) form a key pillar of national UHC policy in many LMIC, 
including in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (for example health systems in Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zambia have all introduced user fee 
exemptions) (Yates 2009, Richard 2013, Ridde, Agier et al. 2015). 
Internationally, user fee removal has had some success; in some cases it has been 
found to increase utilisation for the exempted services, but in many cases it has 
been marred by poor implementation (Ridde, Robert et al. 2012). 
 
This study focuses on a user fee removal policy in Senegal. As in most LMIC, total 
expenditure on health in Senegal is low, at 6% of GDP in 2011 compared to the 
SSA average of 6.5%. Private expenditure on health as a percentage of total 
health expenditure is 41.7% (World Health Organization 2013). This is relatively 
low compared to the average for SSA (54.9%), but high compared to East Asia 
and Pacific (32.4%) and Europe and Central Asian regions (24.6%) (World 
Health Organization 2013). 78.5% of private expenditure on health in Senegal is 
spent directly out-of-pocket as user charges (World Health Organization 2013). 
Out-of-pocket expenditure is the main source of funding for ambulatory care and 
drugs, while government funding is focused on hospital care  (Ministère de la 
Santé 2005). 
 
In order to reduce these high levels of out-of-pocket spending, Senegal has 
introduced a set of user fee exemptions targeting a variety of different 
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population groups and health conditions: deliveries and caesarean sections; 
antiretroviral drugs; anti-TB drugs; severe malaria in children and pregnant 
women; the elderly; and indigents) (MSAS 2007). However all these initiatives 
are experiencing difficulties with implementation (Soors, Devadasan et al. 2010), 
as health service providers continue to charge fees to supposedly exempted 
patients or for supposedly exempted services.  
 
This study analyses the difficulties implementing one of these policies, Plan 
Sésame (PS). PS is a user fee exemption policy launched in Senegal in 2006 which 
aims to provide free access to publicly provided health care services to all 
Senegalese citizens aged 60 years and over – an estimated 5.9% of the total 
population of the country. PS has received insufficient funding by the state (Leye, 
Diongue et al. 2013, Mbaye, Ridde et al. 2013). This has led to the implicit 
rationing of the limited resources which are made available only to some of the 
target population and only some of the time, often at the discretion of local 
health managers and service providers (termed “street level bureaucrats” in 
some literature (Walker and Gilson 2004). Implicit rationing is common in 
publicly funded health services (Ham and Coulter 2001) and has even been 
advocated as a means of enhancing equity (Mechanic 1997) in high income 
country contexts. However, in Senegal, implicit rationing of care provided under 
PS has not affected the target population equally; an evaluation of PS suggests 
great inequity in access the limited funding for free health services.  
 
In a recent survey of 2,933 households in four regions of Senegal, Parmar et al 
(Parmar, Williams et al. 2014) find that only 48% of people aged 60 and over 
were “enrolled” in PS (i.e. both aware of PS and in possession of an ID card that is 
needed to prove their age in order access the Plan). Having the following 
characteristics all statistically significantly increased a person’s odds of enrolling 
in Plan Sesame: being male, being a household head, having formal education, 
living in an urban area, being relatively wealthy, belonging to the majority 
ethnicity, being a member of sociocultural associations, being married or not 
living alone, relatively high political and civic participation, perception of living 
in a safe neighbourhood, having access to information channels (TV or radio) and 
hospitalisation in the last year. Furthermore, only 10.5% of the population was 
found to have ever used PS to access free health care (Ndiaye, Ba et al. 2014). 
Utilisation was also highly inequitable, with wealthier, urban, formal sector 
people being more likely to access free health care under PS than their poorer, 
rural, informal sector counterparts (Ba, Dkhimi et al. 2015).  
 
These findings echo those of other studies of user fee exemptions in LMIC – for 
example in Ghana, Senegal and Sierra Leone removal of maternity fees at the 
point of service increased facility deliveries across the socioeconomic gradient, 
but it did not reduce inequalities defined by household wealth and may have 
even contributed to a widening of educational inequalities (McKinnon, Harper et 
al. 2015); although in contrast in Burkina Faso no inequity in access to exempted 
services was identified (Ridde, Agier et al. 2015).  
 





The quantitative analysis of PS described above (Parmar, Williams et al. 2014), 
as with other regression analyses of health inequalities, is conducted in the 
positivist tradition of constructing ‘objective’ realities or prototypes based solely 
on observable phenomena. However, this type of analysis does little to reveal the 
underlying causal mechanisms that might explain why some social groups 
experience inequity (Popay 1998, Wainwright and Forbes 2000, Hickey and du 
Toit 2013). Recent developments within positivist research seek to integrate 
survey or experimental data with psycho-social theories to explain inequality in 
the health field, notably in the fields of social epidemiology (Kawachi, Kennedy et 
al. 1997, Wilkinson and Marmot 2006). Yet social epidemiological studies have 
been critiqued as being ultimately inadequate for understanding causes of health 
inequalities due to: lack of validity of survey data; lack of evidence to support the 
claim to universality of the proposed relationships between social status, 
internal psychological dynamics, culture and health; and the lack of analysis of 
dynamic relationships between social classes in terms of power relations such as 
exploitation (Forbes and Wainwright 2001, Muntaner, Ng et al. 2015). 
 
The health field is increasingly engaging with the idea that the positivist 
disciplines that dominate in public health (such as biomedicine and 
epidemiology) are useful for understanding patterns of health inequality (for 
example the powerful finding that income distribution is positively correlated 
with negative health outcomes) but are inadequate for explaining the causes of 
health inequality (Wainwright and Forbes 2000) and the complex social and 
political phenomena occurring in health systems (Gilson, Hanson et al. 2011). 
These critiques have increasingly led to calls in the health field for the use of 
alternatives or complementary approaches to positivism, such as interpretivist, 
social constructivist and critical realist philosophies of science (Wainwright and 
Forbes 2000, Gilson, Hanson et al. 2011, Muntaner, Ng et al. 2015).   
 
The hypothesis proposed by Parmar et al (2014) to explain the patterns of 
inequity observed in their results is that social exclusion causes the inequitable 
access to PS. Following the WHO’s Social Exclusion Knowledge Network, they 
define social exclusion as: “dynamic, multidimensional processes driven by 
unequal power relationships interacting across four main dimensions – social, 
political, economic and cultural – and at different levels including individual, 
household, group, community, country and global levels” (Popay 2008). The 
purpose of this present study is to explore their hypothesis and identify whether 
unequal power relationships are indeed the cause of the observed inequity, and 
if so, how and why they occur. Following Popay (1998), one important way in 
which we seek to address these limitations of quantitative surveys of health 
inequalities is by exploring explanations derived from lay knowledge and 
cultural practice in the context of a specific time and place. In doing so we adopt 
a commonly employed methodology in social science to uncover underlying 
causes of patterns identified in quantitative studies; “mixing methods” (Creswell 
2009). We complement the quantitative data from the Parmar et al study with 
qualitative data collected as part of the same research project (the EU funded 
research project “Health Inc” 




As such, the approach taken in this paper takes lay knowledge as its starting 
point. Yet, we argue this is not enough. We heed Hickey and de Toit’s critique of 
mixed methods research in their analysis of social exclusion and adverse 
incorporation, where they argue that “causality is not something that can be 
positivistically uncovered by empirical research alone. Neither the correlations 
generated through statistical analysis of quantitative data nor the descriptive 
accounts of poor people themselves can on their own be claimed to reveal 
transparently the causal mechanisms through which poverty (or any other social 
state or process) is created, maintained or reduced.” They argue that because 
“poverty is embedded within and reproduced by broader societal processes”, 
studies of the causes of social exclusion require “comparative, historicised and 
theoretically-oriented forms of research” (Hickey and du Toit 2013).  
 
Qualitative research on health and health systems is often conducted in 
interpretivist and social constructionist traditions, within the disciplines of 
medical anthropology and medical sociology. This can produce the type of 
comparative, historicised research called for by Hickey and du Toit. In contrast to 
positivism’s concern with the identification of objective truths, interpretivism 
and social constructionism aim to “socially construct detailed pictures of human 
activity, contextually, to capture the social meaning of that activity as it is defined 
by the cultural and sub-cultural tendencies of a given social group by the 
participants” (Wainwright and Forbes 2000). Simply put, social constructionist 
philosophy opposes positivism and the idea that the nature of the world can be 
revealed by empirical observation alone; it counters the notion of universal 
human social or psychological traits, instead emphasising cultural and historical 
specificity; it argues that knowledge is created and sustained through daily 
practice; and it argues that social constructions sustain some forms of practice 
and exclude others and that this process of sustaining and excluding entails 
power and resistance (Burr 2015). Indeed, social constructionism “distances 
itself from causal and deterministic models of psychology and social phenomena 
and prefers theoretical models emphasising the interrelatedness and inseparability 
of these” (Burr 2015). Furthermore, social constructionists argue that any 
attempt to think or talk about the real world is necessarily mediated by 
discourse and that it is therefore impossible to objectively identify the “real”1 
(we return to the issue discourse below).   
 
However, the social constructionist approach seems ill-suited to exploring the 
social exclusion hypothesis set out earlier. This is largely because the social 
exclusion concept seeks to provide a general comparative, or even universal, 
framework that can explain inequity in a multiplicity of contexts, as explained by 
Popay: “Diversity in the meanings attached to the concept of social exclusion 
should not be allowed to mask the commonality of exclusionary processes around 
the world and their fundamental expression, in terms of inequalities in human 
dignity, human rights and human health” (Popay 2008). Similarly, echoing wider 
                                                 
1 Contrary to the often caricatured portrayal of constructionism, most social constructionists do 




critiques of interpretivism and social constructionism (Sayer 2000), Wainwright 
and Forbes argue for the need for studies of health inequalities to take into 
account “broader social forces which may be beyond the consciousness of those 
(study) participants” (Wainwright and Forbes 2000). As such, this paper 
primarily adopts critical realism2, the other main epistemological approach that 
has the potential to produce the type of research called for by Hickey and du Toit. 
Critical realism has increasingly been promoted and adopted in health systems 
and public health research (Wainwright and Forbes 2000, Lacouture, Breton et 
al. 2015, Molnar, O'Campo et al. 2015, Muntaner, Ng et al. 2015), including in 
relation to user fee removal (Robert, Ridde et al. 2012). Like social 
constructionists, critical realists reject the notion that measuring the relationship 
between observed independent and dependent variables in a positivist fashion 
can reveal causal mechanisms. As such, the two epistemological approaches have 
a lot in common. Yet, unlike social constructionists, critical realists do believe 
there is a reality that can be objectively identified. For this reason, critical 
realism is sometimes (simplistically) described as the “third way” between 
positivism and interpretivism (Wainwright and Forbes 2000).  
 
For critical realists, the observed actions and spoken explanations of actors 
(research “subjects”) are important for different reasons than in the case of 
social constructionism. Critical realists argue that lay knowledge forms the 
empirical basis for the identification of mechanisms. The observed patterns can 
be compared to other contexts in order to identify those mechanisms that are 
reoccurring. As such, critical realism is a philosophy of science that locates causal 
relationships at the level of generative mechanisms rather than at the level of 
events (Bhaskar 1975). In order to understand causality in social science, critical 
realists typically argue it is necessary to identify hidden or unobservable 
mechanisms; these mechanisms are real but cannot be observed empirically. 
Critical realists therefore distinguish between three domains: the real, actual and 
empirical. The domain of the real refers to generative mechanisms that are 
independent of humans to exist and act. The domain of the actual refers to events 
that take place, such as policy interventions. The domain of the empirical refers 
to what is observed or sensed by human beings, such as changes that are 
observable (Bhaskar 1975). When activated, unobservable mechanisms will 
always generate outcomes; outcomes (unlike mechanisms) can potentially be 
observed empirically but in practice may not be observable as they may not be 
activated in a particular context, or may be activated at the same time as other 
mechanisms that obscure their effect.  
 
Social constructionist and critical realist theories respectively can, in simple 
terms, be broadly linked to two distinct theories of power. Given the centrality of 
                                                 
2 Critical realism is one of many types of realism (Mahoney 2001, Gross 2009). The various 
strands of realism have much in common, but one major area of disagreement is on the issue of 
methodological individualism. Realists such as Hedström and Swedberg (1998) are 
methodological individualists; in contrast critical realists such as Bhasker (1975) argue that 
causal mechanisms need not be developed using a rational actor individual level analysis; rather 
social structures such as power relations can constitute generative mechanisms (Gross 2009). 
This paper adopts the latter approach, as the results of the study point to the importance of social 
structures as a causal mechanism, as explained in the Discussion section.  
8 
 
power in the concept of social exclusion to be explored in this paper, it is 
important to reflect briefly on these theories here, although the short discussion 
cannot do the issue justice; a more extensive exploration of power dynamics is 
undertaken in the discussion section. Social constructionists’ analysis of power 
relations typically derives from the notion that “discourses can be employed to 
keep people willingly in a condition of oppression by obscuring power relations” 
(Burr 2015). In this sense, social constructionists are interested in unpacking 
ideologies, but their approach arguably tends to differ from the Marxist tradition 
of “false consciousness”. Whereas Marxists and Neo-Marxists tend to believe 
there exists a real, material world in which a dominant class exploits others, but 
that people do not recognise and challenge this reality because it is obscured, 
social constructionists tend to take the Foucauldian approach that no such 
underlying reality can be discerned; rather they argue that there exist various 
“regimes of truth” where one regime is no more correct than another (Burr 
2015). Rather than thinking about causal mechanisms as an interaction between 
two pre-existing entities (i.e. the self (psychology) and social phenomena (social 
structures)), social constructionists tend to think in terms of a dialectical process 
and “the person as being both agentic, always actively constructing the social 
world, and constrained by society to the extent that we must inevitably live our 
lives within the institutions and frameworks of meaning handed down to us by 
previous generations” (Burr 2015). In contrast, critical realists argue that social 
structures established by discourse constitute hidden or unobservable, yet real, 
causal mechanisms that exist outside of this discourse. Critical realists’ emphasis 
on uncovering real underlying causal mechanisms is arguably more compatible 
with Marxist / Neo-Marxist theory and the false consciousness concept (although 
not all realists are necessarily Marxists). Both approaches have strengths and 
limitations: simply put, social constructionists are accused of being unable to 
ground their research in a political or moral stance and of therefore failing to 
promote empowerment; critical realists on the other hand are accused of 
“stopping conversations” by limiting what others can say, or who can be heard 
(Burr 2015). 
 
Few studies of inequalities in health or health care access explicitly distinguish 
between these three epistemological styles underpinning social science 
(positivism, social constructionism and critical realism), explain their rationale 
for their adoption of one instead of another, or attempt to draw on the strengths 
of more than one of them (Wainwright and Forbes 2000). This study seeks to 
address this gap. By taking epistemological and ontological issues into account, 
this paper critically reflects on causality and power relations primarily through a 
critical realist lens - and highlights its strengths and weaknesses as compared to 
the other two epistemological styles in relation to understanding inequitable 
access to PS. The results of this study are discussed with reference to similar 
patterns of exclusion in other contexts and the wider critical realist literature on 
poverty and exclusion, in particular Sen’s capability approach (Sen 2001) and 
Kabeer’s social exclusion framework (Kabeer 2000). Although the mechanisms 
identified are found to be helpful in explaining the causes of inequity in access to 
PS, it is argued they ultimately fail to account for the multiple and contested 
understandings of phenomena that existed among interviewees. This is 
especially the case as regards understanding the role of corruption in the health 
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system. Following a social constructionist line of reasoning (Burr 2015), it is 
argued that a better understanding of often conflicting multiple realities may be 





Semi-structured interviews (SSIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) were 
conducted over a period of six months during 2012 in order to find out how and 
why some types of elderly people are excluded from or included into Plan 
Sesame. A total of 34 SSIs with individual older people (aged over 60) were 
conducted across four regions in Senegal. Elder interviewees were drawn from 
the household survey which preceded the qualitative study and were 
purposively selected to represent a variety of profiles according to whether they 
had: been informed / not informed of Plan Sesame; had used / had not use health 
services in the last year; and had received / had not received a user-fee 
exemption. Other sociodemographic characteristics were also taken into account 
to obtain a range of interviewees (eg urban/rural; gender; formal/informal 
sector; socioeconomic group). Sample size was determined by the data obtained 
and data collection continued until saturation. The interviews lasted 30 minutes 
on average. Many of the interviewees were sick and very old, making it difficult 
to maintain a very long conversation.  
 
A further nineteen FGDs with people aged over 60 were selected in each region 
studied in the HH survey. They were selected purposively to cover a wide range 
of social and demographic characteristics that may be related to the causes of 
social inclusion / exclusion: formal and informal sectors, gender, urban/rural, 
social status in the community, those who are in vulnerable situations (e.g. 
suffering from disabilities, members of “casted” groups) etc. In Dakar the FGDs 
took place in one neighborhood only (Pikine) due to the large size of the city. The 
FGDs lasted around one hour on average and were made up of around 12 people. 
Most were single sex. In several cases, FGD participants were drawn from local 
community associations. This meant that the participants in each group were 
familiar with each other and a free flowing discussion was generated among 
people who were used to debating with each other.  
 
The SSI and FGD interview guides contained the following topics: social and 
economic status; perceptions of the ageing process; social and family support; 
health and access to health care; knowledge, use and perceptions of PS. All SSIs 
and FGDs were of a focused, open-ended type and were conducted in local 
Senegalese languages, recorded, transcribed using verbatim transcription and 
translated. Informed consent was obtained. The authors performed qualitative 
data analysis of all transcripts applying both deductive and inductive coding 
using NVivo10 software. The interview guides, background literature and project 
objectives to study social exclusion were used to develop the coding frame. Wave 
one of the coding used this frame to deductively code the data. In wave two, 
inductive coding (Glaser 1967) was then performed in order to add relevant 
codes to the coding frame. As new codes emerged all transcripts that had been 
previously coded were read again and the new code added where appropriate. 
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Parent and child codes were linked using tree nodes. Both authors independently 
coded the transcripts and the coding was then consolidated and merged. 
Throughout the analysis, reflexivity was taken into account and the position of 
the authors in the interpretation of the data was taken into account. Results from 
the SSIs and FGDs are presented together.  
 
In sum, using a concurrent transformative strategy design (Creswell 2009), the 
qualitative strand of the research aims to make sense of, and progressively 
deepen the results of, the quantitative household survey results (Parmar, 
Williams et al. 2014, Ba, Dkhimi et al. 2015), using deductive coding. Additionally 
the qualitative data are used to develop new understandings beyond the 





Fifteen separate, although often interlinked, causes of inclusion in or exclusion 
from PS were identified across the two qualitative datasets. We also identified 
“parent” codes, which regroup the 15 causes of exclusion or inclusion into four 
broad categories: PS as “a right”, “a privilege”, “a favour”, or “a curse”. The results 
are presented under these four themes. 
 
Before commencing with the main results, it is import to note that as a general 
observation, almost all the older people interviewed complained about having 
illnesses and disabilities. Many were quite fluent in describing their conditions, 
often elaborating on symptoms and diagnoses of chronic conditions like 
hypertension, heart disease and diabetes. Other common complaints were loss of 
sight, hearing and memory, as well as general aches and pains. Some also 
mentioned the difficulty of preventing the onset or minimising the severity of 
chronic diseases due to changes in their lifestyle brought about by modernity, 
such as a high salt and high fat diet.  
 
Another general observation was that across almost all interviews and FGDs 
people reported a lack of resources to satisfy their basic needs, including needs 
in the domain of health. This was often the case even for higher socioeconomic 
groups. Almost all also complained of barriers to accessing health care imposed 
by user fees.  
 
However, some interviewees had managed to alleviate some of these health 
problems and financial access barriers by using PS and through other means, 
while others had not. Explaining these differences is the objective of the 
following analysis.   
 
 
3.1 PS as a poorly implemented and accessed right to health care 
 
This theme groups together perceptions that PS is a right that is available to all 
older people in Senegal in principle, but not in practice as some people do not 
access this right either because of poor government implementation, because of 
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personal choice, or because of individual / household level difficulties. According 
to this view, the government is well intentioned but may be too inept or lacking 
in resources to deliver PS to some of those who are eligible. Others may fail to 
access care for idiosyncratic reasons that are beyond the responsibility of the 
state. Under this theme, no social exclusion was identified by interviewees. In their 
opinion, solving these problems would therefore not necessarily require changes 
in power relations or a fundamental redesign of the policy – in general 
interviewees seemed to think that simply better implementation, entailing a 
bigger budget and more information dissemination, could rectify the lack of 
access to PS.  
 
Inclusion in PS as a result of making a rightful claim on the state 
 
Several interviewees explained their ability to access free health care under PS as 
a result of making a rightful claim on the state based on their prior contributions: 
 
I have used Plan Sesame… I had heart disease, they did a radiograph. I was told 
that I had to pay 30,000 CFA3… when I took bill … the man … said do you know how 
much this radiography normally costs? I said “No”! He said it cost 100,000 CFA. I 
told him “Why are you telling me that?” …. He said … “It's just that I want you to be 
thankful to the Government”. I said, “Do you know how long I’ve been paying taxes? 
Even one percent of what I've paid in taxes does not amount to that”… (FGD, 
Association of District Delegates, Dakar) 
 
Many of the older people who had not accessed PS, across various sectors and 
socioeconomic groups including informal sector workers, also expressed the 
view that they felt they had a right to access free health care and that the state 
should implement the scheme better so they could exercise this right. 
 
Exclusion from PS caused by a lack of information 
 
Some people pointed to the inadequate government information campaign as a 
cause of exclusion from PS. According to this view, more and better-targeted 
information about PS could enhance implementation.  
 
It is… a communication problem because some do not listen to the radio or 
television. So they should have involved the town criers (FGD, Artisans, Diourbel) 
 
They should do as it is done in censuses, entering homes… If they had proceeded in 
this manner, more people would know Plan Sesame. (FGD, Women’s income 
generation group, Diourbel)  
 
In contrast, some people who had benefited from PS several times with no 
problems thought PS functioned well and that information was key to its success: 
 
When you go to the main hospital , you will find 100 people at the desk using PS 
because people talk about it on television, radio and even in ceremonies. In case of 
                                                 
3
 1,000 CFA is equivalent to around €1.50.  
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illness, if you go to the clinic you will be given all the necessary information… you 
can pass information to friends to use it too. (FGD, female members of a CBHI 
scheme, Dakar) 
 
Exclusion from PS due to lack of government funding 
 
Some pointed out that the lack of access to PS was caused by an insufficient 
allocation of funding for the scheme by the central government.  
 
The (central government) administration owes billions to the hospitals, but the 
administration cannot pay and the hospital must pay its employees and make 
savings. The government then went on to say they will not pay (for PS). Also on 
their side (the hospitals) say they will no longer accept the Plan. That's the 
problem. (FGD, men who attend public community meetings (les « Grand-Place 
»), Dakar) 
 
Others suggested that PS ran out of resources due to too much demand: 
 
There was a time when the hospital made a call to take care of the elderly for free . 
But there was a rush and a lot of older people were not treated (FGD, Women’s 
income generation group, Diourbel) 
 
Exclusion from PS due to an incompetent bureaucracy 
 
Many people expressed their frustration with the perceived red tape involved in 
accessing PS, which required a referal letter from the health centre: 
 
I saw an elderly person who tore up the papers he had been given to benefit from 
Plan Sesame. He did it because he was tired of the scheme making him go back and 
forth (FGD, CBHI scheme of the Agricultural Cooperative Insurance, Diourbel) 
 
Self-exclusion from PS 
 
The coding analysis suggested that some people who knew about PS chose not 
use it. There were many possible reasons for this. One was that some older 
people were wealthy and therefore preferred to pay for private health care:  
 
Most users of Plan Sesame are poor because rich people do not need (it). (FGD, 
Women’s income generation group, Diourbel)  
 
An example was one of the interviewees (EPA-C-DK-8), an elderly woman whose 
husband had been in the army and who had lived in France who said that she 
knew about but had not used PS, as she didn’t need it. She said she was 
supported by a large, wealthy family, as she had many children, some of whom 
lived and worked abroad and sent remittances, while other relatives in Senegal 
were working in the formal sector and provided her with funds to access health 




Extreme poverty could in theory also result in a choice not to use PS, as some 
very poor older people were supposed to have access to alternative forms of 
social protection, such as social welfare. However, although social services did in 
theory provide access to free health care, in practice access was often difficult 
due to bureaucracy and corruption (see below). 
 
Many interviees said they used traditional medicine because they could not 
afford to pay user fees at allopathic providers (see below). However some said 
that older people preferred traditional medicine to allopathic, suggesting that in 
those cases, not using PS was a choice: 
 
Sometimes some old people believe in traditional medicine more than hospitals; in 
terms of hospitals , people are afraid of operations, which sometimes go wrong and 
lead to death. (FGD, Artisans, Diourbel) 
 
However in general traditional medicine was not perceived to be a good 
alternative to allopathic health care; many people complained that traditional 
medicine was of poor quality while others pointed out that it cannot treat 
modern diseases, suggesting they thought that preference for traditional 
medicine was ill-informed: 
 
If you treat hypertension with traditional medicine, it will not heal (FGD, Women’s 
association, Matam) 
 
Some older people had access to alternative sources of funding for health care 
through a community-based health insurance scheme. They said their insurance 
provided financial protection from the cost of health care, yet many also 
reported using PS quite extensively. Other informal solidarity mechanisms also 
sometimes replaced the need for PS: 
 
I had an accident. The whole neighborhood contributed and they gave me the 
money for the purchase of the prescription. You know, that's pure solidarity. (FGD, 
men who attend public community meetings (les « Grand-Place »), Dakar) 
 
Finally, there was considerable disillusionment among patients who had heard 
that PS was dysfunctional and, as a result, did not even attempt to access it. For 
example, an elderly widow living a rural village in the Matam region (EPA-E-MT-
20), who had worked in the informal sector, said that she had heard about PS by 
word of mouth but had been told that it did not function so had not tried to use it. 
She reported having considerable unmet need; she was sick with several 
illnesses and could not afford treatment.  
 
Exclusion from PS due to a lack of social support at the household level  
 
In general, helping elderly relatives was seen as a moral duty and households 




(When in difficulty) you do not call your… brother, but rather your father or 
grandfather... So if you do not support him, who is in turn going to help you? (FGD, 
Association of District Delegates, Dakar) 
 
However, some elderly people reported difficulties in accessing care because 
they lacked assistance from their children to accompany them to hospital or care 
for them. This could act as a barrier to accessing PS. The interviews suggested 
that support within the family broke down for many reasons, several of which 
were not related to socioeconomic inequalities. Some said that older people who 
lacked support had only themselves to blame, as they had not fulfilled their own 
filial duties:  
 
A wise saying is that you reap what you sow. I mean, those who are elderly and who 
do not have support at home, it is because… when they were young , they did not 
care for or respect their parents. They end up paying for that when they are old. 
(FGD, Association of people living with a handicap, Diourbel) 
 
Sometimes the causes of a lack of social support were difficult to ascertain from 
the interviews:  
 
Interviewee: … You need to have money to go to hospital or have someone to take 
you. And I have no one who can take me to the hospital… At the beginning my son 
took me, but he doesn’t anymore. 
Interviewer: Why? 
Interviewee: Honestly, I don’t know why… If I had someone who could take me 
there I'd go, but I have no one who can take me. (FGD, Association of handicapped 
women, Dakar) 
 
There could be several interpretations of this dialogue. The woman may know 
why her son didn’t take her, but may not be willing to explain in the FDG. Or she 
may not know and may not be able to discuss the reasons with her son. This 
illustrates that some “causes” of lack of access to PS relate to intimate aspects of 
people’s lives which they are not willing to reveal to researchers. The 
interviewees expressed this on several occasions, for example: 
 
For all that is said, there are still many other things; we just told you the essentials 
but there are things that a person lives with and never dares to speak about… 
(FGD, Association of District delegates, Dakar) 
 
 
3.2 PS as a privilege reserved for elites  
 
This theme brings together codes that identify conscious or subconscious 
discrimination by those in charge of implementing PS as the cause of exclusion 
from PS, from the perspective of the interviewees and/or the authors. According 
to this view, PS is perceived to mainly to benefit privileged people and social 
groups, either through misappropriation of resources or selective distribution of 
resources. From this perspective, accessing PS entailed a (mostly failed) struggle 
over resources by less powerful groups vis-à-vis more powerful social groups 
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who controlled PS resources. In order to succeed in this struggle, social 
structural changes such as empowerment of the less powerful and explicit 
redistribution of health care resources from more to less wealthy would be 
needed. Because of this requirement, the design of the PS policy itself was seen 
to be inadequate, as it did not make provisions for such social structural changes 
and redistribution.  
 
 
Exclusion from PS due to misappropriation of PS funds by health workers and 
other state employees 
 
Many interviewees expressed the view that doctors and other state employees 
were misappropriating the funding allocated to the PS programme: 
 
They have not communicated about Plan Sesame. Doctors do not talk about it. 
Social workers do not talk about it. District leaders do not talk about it. They do not 
because they monopolize the benefits. They hide Plan Sesame. (FGD, Association of 
people living with a handicap, Diourbel) 
 
Many interviewees perceived doctors’ corruption to be the source of poor 
implementation of PS: 
 
President Abdoulaye Wade has certainly put forward the idea (of PS) but it is the 
people who must implement it that do not do it well, namely the doctors… Only 
money interests them, if you give them their 50 000frs they will look after you. If 
you give them nothing they will not treat you. (FGD, men who attend public 
community meetings (les « Grand-Place »), Dakar) 
 
Corruption was perceived to occur not only in relation to PS but also in relation 
to other forms of health care user fee exemption: 
 
You know as well as I do that cesareans are free, but they (midwives / doctors) still 
bill our wives … there are… people who pay and then the state subsidizes the 
cesarean section. (FGD, Association of people living with a handicap, Diourbel) 
 
The social center puts you in touch with the social department of a hospital but 
with the back-and-forth you finally get tired and give up. Sometimes they give you a 
prescription and you go to the pharmacy. But it's a scam. You present your 
prescription at the pharmacy, they give a paracetamol tablet and you're told that 
they don’t have the rest. Yet they get reimbursed for the prescription as if they gave 
you all the drugs. (FGD, Association of people living with a handicap, Diourbel) 
 
Doctors were thought to practice fraud by inducing demand: 
 
Interviewee: Sometimes he (a doctor) prescribes you something knowing that there 
is no hope of recovery . You're wasting your money. 
Interviewer: Why do they do this?  
Interviewee : The health service providers have no pity. Life is hard. (FGD, 




In other contexts medical personnel were found to be behaving correctly while 
other types of state personnel were blamed for the lack of access to PS: 
 
They must appoint someone to take care of PS, especially for disseminating 
information. At the Diourbel clinic, there is someone like that. They do a really good 
job, they even went into rural areas to inform the elderly… But this message was 
not passed on. Even with the neighborhood delegates it is the same… they do not 
spread the word, not even to their wives. (FGD, CBHI scheme of the Agricultural 
Cooperative Insurance, Diourbel) 
 
One group had approached local politicians and bureaucrats to air their 
grievances about misappropriation of funds for free health care for the disabled, 
(a separate policy from PS), without success:  
 
The Chief District Medical Officer hides things. The Regional Chief Medical Officer 
hides things. I’ll give you an example, (the government)… issued a decree which 
stipulates that the disabled shall have the right to free care; when I asked the Chief 
Regional Medical Officer… he replied that it was true, but that he did not try to 
broadcast it. (FGD, Association of people living with a handicap, Diourbel) 
 
In contrast, most interviewees who complained about misappropriation of 
government funds for PS did not report making an official complaint, rather 
accepting the local corruption as unavoidable and seeking alternative avenues to 
fund their health care:  
 
“If the subsidy (for PS) gets here, it is the people who are in charge of that subsidy 
that will take it, to the detriment of others. We only get the information. That's 
what they do to us, but it doesn’t change what I do. If there are subsidies that fail to 
reach beneficiaries, that’s their issue, because on my side, there are good people 
who will come to my rescue.” (FGD, Association of handicapped women, Dakar) 
 
Others did not blame local state officials for the lack of access to PS, observing 
that these officials were themselves under great financial pressure to ration free 
care due to poor financial practices at the central state level. Several 
dysfunctions at the central state level were discussed. Some argued that the 
central government had the capacity to fund PS but was being neglectful 
participants in the FGDs pointed out that HIV and polio information campaigns 
seemed to be well funded and implemented, and that the lack of funding for PS 
must therefore be deliberate. Some suggested that the cause of poor PS roll-out 
was that it had become politicised and opponents of the government ruling party 
had blocked it. Others argued that the central state administration was corrupt 
and had misappropriated the funds for PS, as they did for social funding in 
general: 
 
…when distributing aid the state gives it to the powerful who take half before 
distributing the rest. So that the aid does not reach us… this aid must be directly 
distributed to the populations concerned. (FGD, Association of town criers 




In Matam, some argued that PS lacked resources because the funding for the 
programme did not reach their region under decentralisation: 
 
I do not know if the government is against Matam… even if there is aid allocated 
for the regions, Matam is omitted (FGD, Association of retired civil servants, 
Matam) 
 
Inclusion into PS due to membership of insurance for formal sector retirees 
 
There was evidence in the interviews that certain types of privileged patients did 
manage to benefit from PS. One such type were formal sector retirees. In Senegal, 
IPRES (L'Institut de prévoyance retraite du Sénégal (The Pension Insurance 
Institute of Senegal)) provides free medical coverage to formal sector pensioners 
and their families. However, the IPRES centres did not offer a comprehensive set 
of health services; IPRES subscribers were therefore sometimes referred to other 
facilities, often public hospitals. Previously these services were paid for out-of-
pocket. However, PS extended IPRES medical coverage to selected contracted 
public hospitals outside of its own provider network, funded by its own pension 
contributions. However, IPRES pensioners could also access the central 
government funded services of Plan Sesame at other hospitals, by presenting 
their national ID card instead of their IPRES card.    
 
Many IPRES members in the SSIs and FGDs talked about successfully using PS. 
For example, a widow who was a member of IPRES (EPA-A-DK-1) was happy to 
have received an operation to treat her goitre for free through PS, saying the cost 
of the treatment would normally have been 400,000 CFA. However, membership 
of IPRES was not a guaranteed route to accessing free care under PS, illustrated 
by the same widow who still had unmet need for health care:  
 
Interviewer: What you can suggest to improve Plan Sesame? 
Interviewee: They could help me to have an operation for my eyes, because 500 000 
CFA, that’s expensive... If I had the operation, we would have to pay that amount… 
If eyes were part of PS, that would be a good thing. 
Interviewer: Have you asked if eyes are part of it? 
Interviewee: No, I have not asked them. 
 
This problem of lack of information about the benefits of PS echoes the results in 
the previous section on PS as a poorly implemented and accessed right to health 
care – even relatively privileged people such as those with formal sector 
pensions did not necessarily have good access to PS. Additional barriers 
experienced by IPRES members are discussed below.  
 
Exclusion from PS due to lack of patronage  
 
Throughout the SSIs and FGDs, people generally complained of a patronage 




“Everywhere in Senegal… in all meeting places, offices etc., only rich people and 
those who have networks get the privileges and are treated well.” (FGD, retired 
formal sector, Dakar) 
 
Access to free health care was seen by many to be part of this wider system of 
patronage. Even some IPRES members, who had relatively good access to PS, 
complained about patronage: 
 
The implementation of PS is a bit suspect. There is a partisan management that 
dare not speak its name. When you have someone who knows you, he supports you; 
if by bad luck nobody knows you, you are not supported. This is what I found. (FGD, 
Retired IPRES members (formal sector), Tambacounda) 
 
A man who had received a free hernia operation under PS also complained of 
discrimination: 
 
The referral forms (for PS)… (should be) entrusted to serious people because 
sometimes you come, they tell you that they have run out of their forms, while this 
is not the case. You see people who come next to whom they do give the forms. So 
there is a bias and the doctors should not do that. (FGD, men who attend public 
community meetings (les « Grand-Place »), Dakar) 
 
Several people reported that they had successfully accessed PS due to their elite 
status: 
 
I've used PS two times … I know a manager, a medical director who told me, " Sir , 
I'll do Plan Sesame for you." Twice in the past, but with difficulty. The guy told me 
that "we will do it for you because you’re the boss”. (FGD Association of retired 
state officials, Diourbel) 
 
Some people who did not wield political power or have material resources to 
offer in exchange for patronage, could nevertheless possess extensive 
hierarchical social networks which helped them to obtain access to PS. For 
example, one interviewee (EPA-C-DK-9), a homeless indigent elderly imam of 
noble caste was temporarily living in a Quranic school and relied on alms to 
survive. He was, however, able to use PS thanks to his social networks, as he 
knew a doctor who helped him gain access. This system of social networks was 
described by some interviewees as the “bras longue” (long arm):   
 
Having a “long arm” is to have someone to help you or assist you, to help you to 
obtain papers for example. (FGD, Association of taxi drivers of Tambacounda) 
 
The “long arm” system was seen as a form of corruption: 
 
…in the operation of Plan Sesame, it is as if there is a scam, a case of "long arms". 




In several FGDs, it was reported that people who were not part of the “long arm” 
system were excluded from accessing PS, as observed for example by the imams 
in Tambacounda:  
 
We see elderly people coming to the mosque with their medical bills, they are over 
60 years old, yet they come to seek our help with the payment. We ask why they did 
not… use Plan Sesame, and they tell us “we would need a “long arm” to benefit”.  
 
People from all socioeconomic groups complained of not being able to access PS 
due to the “long arm” system, including formal sector pensioners. In one FGD an 
interviewee explained that he had a “long arm”, which he used to assist people to 
obtain the necessary papers and negotiate access to PS on their behalf: 
 
Most of the elderly people from rural areas , it is when they get here to Tamba that 
they are informed (about how PS works). Often, it's my brothers who ask me to 
accompany them to the hospital to guide them… some come without their ID 
card…they remain without care for three to four days while their ID card arrives. 
On the arrival of the identity card, I accompany them to the hospital to help them 
regularize the papers for the treatment… (FGD, Association of taxi drivers of 
Tambacounda) 
 
It is unclear from this quotation if the interviewee performed this service free of 
charge or whether an informal economy had developed around PS, where people 
with “long arms” were hired as intermediaries to facilitate access.  
 
There were mixed feelings about the “long arm” system, even among many of 
those who benefited from it. For example a village chief with a large social 
network and relatives living abroad who sent him remittances (EPA-C-TC-25) 
had used PS several times but said he felt it was morally wrong that he had 
accessed free care through the “long arm” system. Some retired formal sector 
workers, despite complaining about the “long arm” system, actually had 
benefited from it, in terms of access to PS. Others stated they thought these social 
inequalities were “natural”: 
 
Inequalities come from divine will. There are people who are high up, others low 
down and the rest in the middle. This is fundamental. (FGD, CBHI scheme of the 
Agricultural Cooperative Insurance, Diourbel) 
 
Exclusion from PS due to lack of financial resources 
 
In almost all FGDs and in many interviews, it was apparent that (ironically) 
money was needed to access free care under PS. One reason was to cover the 
costs of travel to the hosptial. Another reason was due to the poor design of the 
policy. People pointed out that even though the hospital fees are covered by PS, 
the scheme did not cover out-patient prescriptions: 
 
PS only facilitates small expenses, such as buying tickets which cost between 500 
and 1000 F. This is helpful for a truly elderly person. But if you go and pay a ticket 
for 1000 or 500 F and then they prescribe medications worth 30-40 000F, there you 
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have problems paying the whole lot. In that case, there is no more social assictance. 
They (PS) just need to cover the whole lot. (FGD, Association of taxi drivers of 
Tambacounda) 
 
Many informal sector interviewees complained of living in serious poverty, with 
no secure source of income. In contrast, the widow mentioned above (EPA-A-DK-
1) was able to benefit from PS in part because she had funds to pay for the 
diagnostic tests (46 200CFA) and to take a taxi to the hopsital. She had several 
sources of funds: her deceased husband had been wealthy and left several 
houses to their six children, her daughter in law lived abroad and sent 
remittances, she had a pension and she was also able to work, until recently 
running a small tailoring business. When she started losing her sight, she was 
able to hire a tailor. She was also able to pay a maid to take care of her.  
 
Money was also required to access PS due to the need to provide under-the-table 
payments: 
 
The inequalities (in access to PS) are caused by… the types of relationships that 
doctors have with some patients. They favour certain people, those who use money 
to corrupt, to see the doctor.  (FGD, Association of town criers (traditional 
communicators), Diourbel) 
 
Money was also said to be needed to afford nice clothes so as to dress 
apporpriatley for a hopstial visit, in order to give the impression to health 
workers that you expect to be well taken care of. 
 
Lack of financial resources to pay for access to PS affected both formal and 
informal sectors. Many formal sector pensioners complained of serious financial 
problems due to their families relying on the income from their pensions for 
survival. This was a source of great stress for many: 
 
Pensions must be reviewed because they are insufficient. The day we receive our 
pension, is that day that we feel sicker; all our pathologies awaken from 
hibernation. We spend all day arbitrating between paying for bills and food. (FGD, 
Retired IPRES members (formal sector), Tambacounda) 
 
Some pensioners said they didn’t actually receive the pension payments that 
were owed to them by the state: 
 
You see I have filed my papers but do not think I got something… I filled in all the 
papers, paid the postal checks, I paid even the papers of the court, but I still cannot 
recover my dues, and I'm tired. (FGD, Association of retired civil servants, Matam) 
 
Participants of almost all FGDs complained about youth unemployment – even 
many IPRES members who had retired from formal sector jobs said they need to 
support their adult children financially, because their children could not find 
work. This explains why even formal sector IPRES members were not 




A lack of economic capital could also be seen as an indirect cause of exclusion 
from PS due to shifting social values which held wealth to be a source of respect. 
Participants of almost all FGDs said that values in Senegal had changed and 
elders were no longer respected. They often pointed to the example that people 
no longer gave up their seat for them on the bus or listened to their advice or 
instructions, as illustrations of this deteriorating respect. Some argued that the 
cause of this was that economic wealth has overtaken age as a marker of respect: 
 
Today, people respect only those who are rich, whether they are an elder or not. 
(FGD, Artisans, Diourbel) 
 
When asked for the cause, several interviewees blamed the capitalism system: 
 
We are in a capitalist system which means that only wealthy people are respected. 
(FGD, Artisans, Diourbel) 
 
This stands in contrast to the results reported in the previous theme where 
people without financial resources could nevertheless access PS due to their 
social influence and status. Similarly, others pointed out that financial resources 
alone were not enough to access PS, and that social support within the domestic 
sphere was also necessary (as discussed above):  
 
Sometimes you're from a wealthy family, but the elderly person does not benefit 
from the help of his family. That happens. (FGD, Women’s income generation 
group, Diourbel) 
 
Exclusion from PS due to unequal power relations within the household 
 
Some elders described intra-household dynamics as being caused by unequal 
power relations. For old men, a lack of social support could occur because they 
had lost power in the household: 
 
The worst thing that happens to us is due to our wives. You made your way 
together with someone when times were good, but now that we're ugly and old, 
they avoid us… Now that we have nothing left, no strength, we are no longer 
important. (FGD, Association of District Delegates, Dakar) 
 
The members of the Agricultural Cooperative Insurance of Diourbel saw the 
exclusion of old men as part of a wider shift in social values, caused by the 
empowerment of women and children through modern education. They also felt 
that elders suffered from poverty due to sacrifices they made for the young: 
 
… when poverty is rife , it is the elderly who have small children who will feel it the 
most because they will sacrifice themselves for their children to survive. (FGD, CBHI 
scheme of the Agricultural Cooperative Insurance, Diourbel) 
 
Exclusion from PS due to a lack of awareness of right to free health care or of 




Many interviewees were fatalistic about their lack of access to PS. They accepted 
their inability to access free health care, which was not perceived as a right: 
 
Interviewer: What do you expect of the government in terms of health care?  
Interviewee: The government? In terms of health care, I expect the government to 
help us, that’s what I think. If it helps me in terms of health care, I will take it, if it 
does not help me, I accept it and say, well it's me who cannot afford it. (FGD, female 
beggars, Dakar) 
 
In some cases people expressed a religious fatalism, accepting the lack of access 
as God’s will: 
 
Interviewer: What can the government do to help (you to access health care)?  
Interviewee: Just help us! We are here, we are poor, we do not have the means. If it 
(the government) comes to our aid that’s good. Anyone who is in power and that 
helps us is good. Whoever does not help us, we also know that it was God who 
decided. Yes, we will pray for every person that God put here, and if he does not do 
it (help), we shall say that God has decided it… (FGD, female beggars, Dakar) 
 
These cases were interpreted by the authors as an example of social exclusion 
from PS, even though the interviewees did not necessarily perceive it as such. 
The ability to subjectively ascertain ones own need and right to access health 
care is a complex issue that is elaborated in the discussion section of this paper. 
This complexity was also illustrated by some interviewees who believed that 
some older people convinced themselves they did not need to access health care, 
so as not to be disappointed with the lack of financial access:  
  
In Senegal, when you get sick you are told that you are old, it is old age that awaits 
you, whereas in fact you need treatment. Instead of going to the hospital, you prefer 
to stay home under the pretext that it's just old age… But to go to the clinic you 
need money, whereas we have nothing. Therefore, the one who should take you to 
the hospital will be content just to say that it is just old age. (FGD, female members 
of a CBHI scheme, Dakar) 
 
 
3.3 PS as a favour or moral obligation to a friend or family member 
 
This sub-section groups together a third set of perceived causes of exclusion 
from or inclusion in PS. Many interviewees stated that PS is only available to 
those who have a friend or relative working at a hospital. This meant that many 
those who used PS were elites, as health workers, and their friends and family, 
were usually from relatively high socioeconomic groups. As such, this cause 
could conceivably be included in the sub-section above which focuses on PS as a 
privilege. However, underprivileged people could gain access to PS under this 
theme, as the prevailing mechanism facilitating access was friendship and family 
networks rather than (or in addition to) patronage, hierarchical social networks, 
or financial resources. As such, under this theme, access to PS is organised 
through prevailing social norms around affective relations; these were in general 




Inclusion in PS due to being a relative or friend of a health worker 
 
There was a perception that health workers used PS and other user fee 
exemptions to provide free health care to their families and friends: 
 
You will never see a doctor or midwife use their own money (as user fees) to take 
care of their own father or mother (FGD, Association of people living with a 
handicap, Diourbel) 
 
Many interviewees talked about accessing PS with the help of a family member 
or friend: 
 
I go to the Principal Hospital without difficulty because someone there is the son of 
my brother. Usually when I go there, I called in advance and …he will help me so 
that I will not have any difficulty… I got hospitalized for two months, when I had to 
leave the care was valued at about 700.000f (€1,067) but I didn’t pay anything ... If 
I had to pay, I would have died, because I do not have the money. All my wives, if 
they have problems, they go to the hospital and they are looked after… they pay 
nothing… (FGD, Association of District Delegates, Dakar) 
 
Several participants described this process as the “system camarade” (“buddy 
system”), which was viewed as innate, or “God-given”:   
 
The “buddy system” has always existed. God created it… You will see a patient who 
has a doctor friend.... He feels ill, he called the doctor. The doctor will make an 
effort and go to see him at home. Sometimes, he will give him medication before 
leaving. This is the “buddy system”… if you're ill, you will go somewhere where you 
have a friend. (FGD, Artisans, Diourbel) 
 
People differentiated between the “long arm” system and the “buddy system” as 
two different types of social networks: 
 
Interviewee: X is a doctor, he was born and grew up here. He knows he has older 
brothers here who have seen him grow. That is why everyone will tell you that “I 
thank Dr X”.  
Interviewer: Does he take care of you?  
Interviewee: Yes, but it is not a case of the “long arm”, he is a friend... This is a 
network and the “long arm” is another network. (FGD, Association of District 
Delegates, Dakar) 
  
Even those who denounced the “long arm” system, were glad to benefit from the 
“buddy system”: 
 
Interviewee: If you're not like them (the main Imam and the head of the district), 
you will not be able to have (PS) papers easily… 
Interviewer: Have you ever tried to get the papers?  
Interviewee: I've never tried because I know I will not get them, I am poor. But Dr X 
is like a son to me, and he helps me a lot. If I go to him without money he gives me 
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medicine anyway. (FGD, men who attend public community meetings (les « 
Grand-Place »), Dakar) 
 
As such, the “buddy system” was not seen as a form of corruption; rather, it was 
perceived as acceptable, or even moral, for a health worker to give access to free 
health care under PS to a close friend or relative.  
 
 
3.4 PS as a curse 
 
This theme puts into question whether accessing PS was necessarily desirable. 
Many of those who accessed PS reported that they did so on adverse terms. As 
such, although people seemed to be included, in that they did receive free care, 
there were various costs such as poor quality of care, opportunity costs due to 
long waiting times or high associated financial costs (see above), all of which 




Inclusion with long waiting times 
 
Formal sector retirees complained that using PS entailed a great deal of time 
consuming bureaucracy, traveling across town to obtain referrals, getting up at 
4am in order to get to do so and to beat the long queues, queuing for hours, being 
sent from one hospital / office to another, and so on. Being sick and elderly made 
this especially arduous. Once the appointment had been made, waiting times to 
receive the service could be several months. Once the service was received, 
under the table or official co-payments were often requested, even though the 
service should have been delivered free of charge. These problems were not 
unique to PS; the formal sector retirees made similar complaints about using 
IPRES. 
 
Inclusion with poor quality of care 
 
Quality of care could be poor; one man spoke of his wife dying, having been, in 
his opinion, discharged from hospital too early after being in a coma for four 
months. Some believed that using PS could lead to worse quality care than if user 
fees were paid: 
 
The elderly person who shows up at the hospital with their own resources is taken 
care of more carefully than the one that came to use PS. The one who pays directly 
is better taken care of. (FGD Association of retired state officials, Diourbel) 
 
 
4. Discussion: How and why were people excluded from accessing free 
health care under the PS programme? 
 
The results present a complex range of different causal explanations for the 
inequity in access to PS observed in the household survey. Many of the 
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explanations were countervailing, contradictory or contested. Some of the 
causes, such as the “long arm” system, seemed to be driven by the types of 
unequal power relationships that underpin the definition of social exclusion 
(Popay 2008), but others, such as the “buddy system”, widely perceived by 
interviewees as morally sound, did not. Although interviewees distinguished 
between the two systems, there was conceptually a great deal of overlap 
between them and it could be argued that based on a Weberian model of 
bureaucracy, the “buddy system” was unethical despite interviewees’ subjective 
perceptions.  
 
Some people said they did not expect free access to health care and were 
fatalistic about their lack of access to PS, while others were angered by the lack 
of access and complained about it to government authorities, albeit to no avail. 
Here again, it is possible to question the perspective of the interviewees, and 
argue that the fatalistic attitude was a form of false consciousness (Rosen 1996). 
In some cases, a person was both included and excluded in PS; for example they 
had successfully accessed PS once, but did not again, despite having unmet need. 
Or, they were included in PS, but on adverse terms (Hickey and du Toit 2013). In 
other cases, people did not know why they were excluded from accessing PS, or 
were unwilling to fully explain the causes of exclusion to the interviewer. 
Meanwhile some people blamed corrupt doctors and nurses for some patients’ 
inability to access PS, while others said health workers’ selective implementation 
of PS was caused by corruption among local or national government officials.  
 
This Discussion section seeks to reconcile these differences in perspective or 
understanding across the fifteen various causes of inclusion in or exclusion from 
PS using a critical realist epistemological framework. However, as we proceed, 
we are also open to the possibility of the need to adopt a more social 
constructionist approach, as we recognise that causality is a long-debated and 
ultimately unresolved issue in social science and that no one framework is likely 
to provide a comprehensive explanation for complex social phenomena such as 
the one presented in this paper, and in health systems research more widely 
(Gilson, Hanson et al. 2011). According to the critical realist paradigm, the same 
mechanisms are likely to operate in many different contexts. We therefore 
sought to identify mechanisms in the existing critical realist literature and apply 
them to our data. In reviewing the critical realist literature on inequity, poverty 
and social exclusion, the work of two scholars, Amartya Sen and Naila Kabeer, 
seems to be especially pertinent to explaining our results. Of particular relevance 
is their engagement with the “agency-structure” debate in social science (i.e. 
whether social structures or individuals have primacy in shaping human 
behaviour) and also their interpretation of the “false consciousness” argument. 
We then move to a more historically oriented and contextual interpretation of 
the results, drawing again on the existing literature. Here the work of Olivier de 
Sardan and colleagues is used to explain how and why certain causal 
mechanisms emerged and persist in the Senegalese health system. Yet, as the 
analysis progresses, it becomes apparent that there are limitations in the critical 
realist interpretations of our data. At the end of this section, the social 
constructionist literature on corruption is therefore employed to address some 
of these limitations.   
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In sum, in the following paragraphs, the results of this study are linked to causal 
mechanisms and debates identified in the wider political, sociological, 
anthropological and economic literature, in order to explain how and why 
certain types of people were excluded from accessing PS. 
 
Sen’s capability approach 
 
We start with the capability approach, pioneered by Amartya Sen (2005), which 
focuses on developmental ends rather than means by distinguishing between “(i) 
whether a person is actually able to do things she would value doing, and (ii) 
whether she possesses the means or instruments or permissions to pursue what she 
would like to do” (Sen 2005). In the context of PS, the capability approach shifts 
attention from the means to access health care facilitated by the PS policy and 
people’s knowledge of it (the instrument or permission) and its requisite level of 
funding (the means), to whether people are actually able to use it to access free 
health care (the ends). Sen (1999) argues that people have varying needs and 
will therefore require different levels of resources in order to achieve the same 
standard of living. He gives five reasons why people may not achieve 
developmental ends, despite having the means to do so: (1) personal 
heterogeneity (physical and biological differences between human beings); (2) 
environmental diversity (differences in physical environments); (3) variations in 
social climate (different social contexts); (4) differences in relational 
perspectives (differences in customs that cause different requirements for 
achieving the same capability); and (5) differential distribution within the family 
(the same resources may not produce the same capabilities for all household 
members).  
 
There has also been some debate over the extent to which the capability 
approach is explanatory. Some argue that it is a normative approach that helps to 
describe different forms of social exclusion but that it is not an explanatory 
theory for any social phenomenon (Robeyns 2005, Deneulin and McGregor 
2010). As such, it may not be helpful for uncovering causal mechanisms for the 
inequity presented in this study. However, Smith and Seward (2009) argue the 
capability approach can be interpreted from a critical realist perspective since 
“Sen’s notion of capabilities is an ontological conception of a relational society. In 
this perspective, an individual’s capabilities emerge from the combination and 
interaction of individual-level capacities and the individual’s relative position vis-à-
vis social structures that provide reasons and resources for particular behaviors. 
Crucially, this conception of society is predicated upon a contextual notion of 
causality that is flexible enough to incorporate both individual and social causes 
into social analysis”.  
 
We find the capability approach useful for interpreting the results of this study. 
The lack of health service provision in rural areas, with the resulting (often 
prohibitively) high indirect travel costs of accessing urban health facilities 
incurred by rural residents and the bureaucratic procedures (e.g. the need for ID 
cards and referral letters) that exacerbate the problem by requiring people to 
repeatedly travel to and from health facilities, can be categorised under 
environmental diversity. The policies needed to redress geographic barriers to 
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health care in LMIC are well understood and elaborated in the international 
literature, especially in terms of the expansion of primary health care (World 
Health Organization 2008). Addressing administrative and bureaucratic barriers 
is more challenging as they are often viewed as necessary – many social health 
protection schemes use membership cards and referral letters to prevent 
leakage of benefits to those who are ineligible and to promote efficient use of 
health care. Yet there is a need to design less arduous procedures which do not 
discriminate against people living in remote areas.  
 
The study’s results on the “long arm” and “buddy system” suggest that 
individuals without social networks or money for patronage lack the capacity to 
access PS. This could be categorized as differences in relational perspectives. 
This has been found in other literature on user fee exemptions (Walker and 
Gilson 2004, Ridde, Robert et al. 2012). Kabeer (2000) has described this gaps 
between rules and their implementation as “unruly practices”. “Street-level 
bureaucrats” in public institutions unofficially perpetuate exclusion when public 
sector workers reflect the prejudices of their society through their position, in 
this way institutionalising discrimination.  
 
Sen’s approach is especially useful for interpreting the results on intra-
household exclusion of elders. Several interviewees justified neglect of some old 
people by family members as retribution for elders’ past misdemeanors. Others 
argued that exclusion of elders was unjustified, as it was caused by their loss of 
economic power. Regardless of the immediate cause of discrimination, the 
results highlight the inability to access free health care under PS by elders who 
lack the support of household members. Sen places such intra-household 
discrimination at the centre of its analysis, especially as regards women. 
Robeyns (2003) has described this an “ethically individualistic” approach which 
implies that the units of normative judgment are individuals, and not households 
or communities. She argues that despite his focus on the individual, Sen does not 
reduce human behaviour to methodological individualism: “… the capability 
approach is not ontologically individualistic. It does not assume atomistic 
individuals, nor that our functionings and capabilities are independent of our 
concern for others or of the actions of others. The social and environmental 
conversion factors also allow us to take into account a number of societal features, 
such as social norms and discriminatory practices. In sum, the ethically 
individualistic and ontologically nonindividualistic nature of the capability 
approach is a desirable characteristic for well-being and inequality analysis” 
(Robeyns 2003). She argues these properties of the capability approach make it 
“attractive for feminist research, because ethical individualism rejects the idea that 
women’s well-being can be subsumed under wider entities such as the household or 
the community, while not denying the impact of care, social relations, and 
interdependence between family or community members” (Robeyns 2003). The 
same could be argued as regards research on older people, as in this study. A 
capability approach to PS therefore takes the differential ability of some elders to 
access PS due to intra-household exclusion into account, implying the need for 
assistance and transportation for elders who cannot rely on family members to 




Another complex issue raised in the results is differential subjective, internalized 
perceptions of health, wellbeing, and effective health services. Interviewees 
argued that some elders preferred traditional medicine to allopathic, while 
others argued that some elders did not believe they were sick because they did 
not expect to be able to access care. These subjective perceptions may have 
affected demands that were made of the state. It is striking that most of the 
people we interviewed did not actively demand their right to free health care, 
even if they were informed of it: only the members of the association of 
handicapped people made explicit demands and complaints about lack of rightful 
access, to no avail. Some interviewees were fatalistic about their lack of access to 
free health care, saying it was God’s will and not the fault of the government. 
These could be argued to be examples of psychological adaption, or internalised 
discrimination. Sen incorporates internalised discrimination into the capability 
approach, arguing that ‘‘our desires and pleasure-taking abilities adjust to 
circumstances, especially to make life bearable in adverse situations’’ (Sen 1999). 
 
The capability approach deals with this by rejecting individual preferences as 
foundations for evaluating wellbeing due to their endogenous or adaptive nature, 
opting instead for a more objective set of measures such as whether people have 
access to health, education, can protest, vote, etc. A capability approach to PS 
would need to take internalized discrimination into account, not only by 
educating people on the benefits of allopathic health care and their right to free 
health care, but also by adapting provision, by asking traditional healers to refer 
patients to allopathic services for example. However, this aspect of the capability 
approach has been critiqued as a “false consciousness” argument that “allows 
researchers and policy-makers to discount or devalue the meanings and 
understandings that form the basis for poor peoples’ decisions and actions and in 
doing so opens the way for forms of paternalism where there is an assertion of 
‘superior’ views, values and meanings which arise from higher authority, from 
theory or from a position of more enlightened understanding” (Deneulin and 
McGregor 2010). As outline in the Introduction, this issue is a limitation of 
critical realism more broadly, and is taken up in the next section on social 
constructionism.  
 
A further limitation of Sen’s capability approach is that it does not specify which 
capabilities and freedoms public policy should promote. He argues that each 
society should determine this through public reasoning or public discussion, but 
this has been critiqued as overly idealistic, as it underestimates “the power that 
lies behind the meanings that can be brought to bear in… processes of public 
reasoning and deliberation” (Deneulin and McGregor 2010). In other words, in 
debates over equity, some issues and ideas are likely to be contested, with more 
powerful actors’ interpretation of contested meaning being more likely to prevail 
than those of less powerful actors. This problem has two possible solutions. One 
is to adopt a more explicit explanatory framework which recognizes some 
universal principles; the other is to reject the idea of a universal explanatory 
framework and adopt a social constructionist approach (Deneulin and McGregor 
2010). The latter is discussed in the next subsection. Here, we move to a more 





Kabeer’s social exclusion framework 
 
Kabeer takes an anti-positivist stance in her work, arguing that “Our knowledge 
of the world is constructed rather than discovered. It is therefore likely to be shaped 
and limited by the location of the knower in the world" (Kabeer 1994). Yet she 
argues against the social constructionist paradigm, stating that the view that 
objectivity is impossible to achieve has “disastrous implications for those who 
have to take policy decisions, since it denies the possibility of a theoretically 
informed practice”. She ultimately adopts a critical realist approach in her work 
(Olsen 2004), arguing for a “situated objectivity” in research, entailing “a 
commitment to look at contrary evidence; the aim of maximum replicability 
through accurate reporting of all processes employed…; a commitment to truth-
finding or veracity; and clarification and classification of values underlying the 
endeavor” (Kabeer 1994).  
 
One of the main generative mechanisms of social exclusion proposed by Kabeer 
(2000) is Weber’s concept of “social closure”. This classic sociological concept is 
defined as the way in which “social collectivities seek to maximize rewards by 
restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles” 
(Parkin 1979) in (Kabeer 2000). This involves the monopolisation of certain 
opportunities based on group attributes, such as race, language, social origin and 
religion. Institutions cause exclusion when they deliberately discriminate in their 
laws, policies or programmes. While this concept is widely used in the analysis of 
the causes of poverty, it has been neglected in research on health inequalities; 
this has led to a call for a realist attention to social class as a causal mechanism in 
health inequalities studies (Muntaner, Ng et al. 2015).  
 
In the results of this study, the “long arm” system is an outcome of social closure; 
health workers deliberately discriminated against people who were not part of 
the elite patronage system. The assertion that PS can be accessed through IPRES 
could possibly be seen as an outcome of social closure as it privileges access by 
formal sector over informal sector. But it is not clear if this was a deliberate and 
conscious strategy of policymakers designing PS. The monopolisation of PS by 
urbanites due to unequal distribution of hospitals could also be seen as another 
outcome of social closure – those living in rural areas without the financial 
resources to travel and stay in the city are excluded from free health care. 
However, again it is difficult to find evidence of whether this exclusion was 
conscious and deliberate on the part of policymakers; these questions of intent 
need further research in the context of PS.  
 
Unintended or subconscious discrimination is termed “mobilisation of 
institutional bias” – it is another commonly occurring generative mechanism of 
social exclusion. Kabeer (2000) draws on Lukes (2005) who in turn refers to 
Bachrach and Baratz who define it as “a predominant set of values, beliefs, rituals 
and institutional procedures ("rules of the game") that operate systematically and 
consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others. 
Those who benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their 
vested interests”. This mechanism operates without conscious decisions by those 
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who represent the status quo. Analysis of this dimension of power calls for the 
researcher to look beyond people’s subjective explanations of conflict and to 
seek a more objective perspective to reveal processes of domination (Lukes 
argues that a full critique of power should include both subjective and objective 
interests).  
 
The results suggest that the “buddy system” is an outcome of mobilisation of 
institutional bias.  People who use the “buddy system” believe they are not 
discriminating against others outside of the system – many people denounce the 
“long arm” whilst supporting the “buddy system”. But one could argue that in 
fact they are discriminating without realising it. Ostensibly, this interpretation of 
the results points to the need to alter power structures. Yet the results present a 
complex and contradictory picture as regards power relations.  
 
Inclusion/exclusion was not fixed but was in flux, changing all the time. Many of 
the ostensibly “included” formal sector urban interviewees who had accessed to 
free health care under PS, described sometimes being excluded from PS due to a 
lack of bras longue or money, for example. Some described accessing PS but on 
adverse terms, as IPRES and PS often provided poor quality care (PS as a 
“curse”). This has been termed adverse incorporation (Hickey and du Toit 2013).  
 
Historically rooted and contextual perspectives  
 
Critical realism places cultural and historical specificity as well as social theory at 
the centre of the analysis. As such, it is important to ask why social closure and 
mobilisation of institutional bias occur specifically in the Senegalese health 
system. The design of this study did not allow us to answer this question, but the 
wider literature is helpful in this regard. Anthropologists such as Farmer (2004), 
Lock and Nguyen (2010) and Olivier de Sardan (2003) have sought to 
understand the causes of present day inequalities and ineffectiveness of SSA 
health systems by tracing them historically to the colonial and post-colonial eras, 
arguing for the need to look beyond the ethnographically visible and take into 
account history and wider politics. Farmer (2004) and Lock and Nguyen (2010) 
have highlighted that in SSA, early colonial health systems were primarily 
focused on the health of colonisers and the need for preservation of health of 
labourers. This led to coercive application of biomedicine on the workforce, 
while the health of the rest of the population was left largely to the care of 
missionaries. World War II ushered in new era of rights-based international 
rhetoric that put colonialism into question. Colonisers sought to justify their 
continued presence in colonies, in part by upgrading or introducing publicly 
funded colonial welfare policies. However, there was an unwillingness to invest 
necessary resources to cover the entire population. Late colonial health 
infrastructure was therefore hospital and urban focused and provided mainly 
curative services for the colonial and native elite. This inequitable structure 
continued in post-colonial era, in part because the personnel working in the 
health system pre and post independence were the same (due to the colonial 
policy of indirect rule) and in part because of the extreme shortages of health 
workers due to colonial education policies which had not trained sufficient 
native medical personnel. This history is almost never mentioned in research 
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and reports on UHC. This silence is troubling, as it goes some way to explaining 
why PS was implanted into a structurally inequitable health system. Yet it 
doesn’t explain why until today, policies like PS continue to reinforce rather than 
overturn this inequity through social closure and mobilisation of institutional 
bias.   
 
Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan (2003) seek to explain why in recent times existing 
personnel are unable or unwilling to expand access equitably.  In an excellent 
and immensely detailed ethnography (published only in French), they analyse 
relationships between health workers and patients in five francophone West 
African cities, including Dakar in Senegal. They dedicate a chapter (Olivier de 
Sardan 2003) to tracing the origins of the difficulties they encountered, prime 
among which were the types of practices described in this study (the “long arm” 
and “buddy” systems), as well as unresponsive and poor quality care. They find 
that the three commonly invoked explanations - heartlessness or selfishness of 
health personnel; incompatibility of modern medicine with traditional African 
culture; and poverty or lack of income – are simply erroneous.  
 
Rather, they attribute the difficulties to “practical norms”4 that were present not 
only in medicine, but also in the wider bureaucratic culture, arguing that health 
personnel in all five of their case studies behaved towards patients in a similar 
way that bureaucrats behaved towards users in other public services. This wider 
bureaucratic culture is a subject on which Olivier de Sardan has published 
extensively (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006) and is only briefly summarised 
here. He finds it is characterised by adaptations developed by colonisers in order 
to transcend the public / private boundaries of the classic Weberian bureaucracy 
imported to SSA from Europe. He argues that the need to transcend these 
boundaries is present in all bureaucracies, including in Europe, but the manner 
in which this is done varies. In colonial SSA these adaptations included: 
despotism within the bureaucracy; privileges accorded to bureaucrats regardless 
of competence or merit; and informal everyday corruption of “intermediaries” – 
i.e. “street level” bureaucrats, administrators, local leaders and others who 
interface between the bureaucracy and the wider population. As a result, the 
service users who colluded in this everyday corruption received an (overly) 
personalised service, while the “anonymous user” of services who was unable or 
unwilling to participate in corruption was treated with profound indifference. 
These bureaucratic adaptations worsened after independence, becoming more 
extreme in the post-colonial period, as has been widely documented by Olivier 
de Sardan and others (see (Bayart 2009) for example).  
 
As with all bureaucrats, health workers continued to face a conflict of interest 
between their social and domestic obligations to maximize profit from their 
bureaucratic privileges on one hand and their work in an unstimulating, 
                                                 
4
 Farmer (2004) similarly argues that health policymakers and health workers in SAA and other 
low income country contexts have been “socialized for scarcity” through a process “informed by a 
complex web of events and processes stretching far back in time and across continents” resulting in 





uncooperative, poorly managed and unproductive public sector, with the former 
priority dominating the latter. The indifference towards service users in the 
health sector took on a particularly troubling form, since health workers needed 
to numb themselves to the suffering they witnessed daily, and they lacked 
authority vis-à-vis patients due to their poor training and the presence of rival 
health knowledge, traditional medicine. The massive recruitment and training of 
health workers during the 1970s and 1980s was conducted within this 
institutional framework.  
 
Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan show ethnographically how these practical norms of 
profound indifference to the anonymous patient and over-personalisation of 
services to the privileged patient continue to be passed from one generation of 
health workers to the next (with the exception of a few charismatic individuals 
who manage to overcome this transmission of norms), as newly qualified staff 
are berated by their seniors if they seek to deviate from the practical norms they 
themselves inherited. The introduction of user fees under structural adjustment, 
with the hope of improving service delivery through commercialization of the 
health system combined with community oversight and participation, did little, 
or nothing, to change this (worsening rather than improving access to care 
(McPake 1993)). In a more recent special issue Olivier de Sardan and colleagues 
present several other studies covering several West African countries (Olivier de 
Sardan and Ridde 2015, Ridde 2015) that echo the results on PS, demonstrating 
that user fee removal policies have also failed to address these underlying 
practical norms. This poses the question – what policies are needed, in 
conjunction with user fee removal, in order to overturn deep-rooted inequity in 
the health system?  
 
At the end of their ethnography, Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan (2003) critique the 
standard global health interventions designed to improve equity and quality of 
care attempted in West Africa and elsewhere; these include training of health 
workers, increasing salaries, provision of public health information to the 
general population, vertical programmes targeting priority diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, and patient-centred care. Many studies recommending these standard 
health sector interventions draw on a positivist tradition, focusing exclusively on 
of constructing ‘objective’ realities or prototypes based solely on observable 
phenomena. As a result these interventions are largely focused on addressing 
economic and psychological determinants of the problem.  
 
A good example of this is the current major international policy focus on pay-for-
performance (P4P), defined as “the transfer of money or material goods 
conditional on taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined 
performance target” (Witter 2013).  In LMIC, P4P is increasingly used to pay 
payment governments, local governments, NGOs, facilities and individual health 
workers), aiming to improve quality of care, increase the allocative efficiency of 
health services (by encouraging the provision of high priority and cost effective 
services); to increase technical efficiency (by making better use of existing 
resources such as health staff); and to improve equity of outcomes (for example, 
by encouraging expansion of services to hard-to-reach groups) (Witter 2013). 
Yet a recent literature review of P4P interventions to strengthen strengthening 
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delivery of sexual and reproductive health services (one of the most common 
groups of services targeted by this policy) found that despite its popularity with 
donors and rapid roll out across over twenty LMIC, there is a distinct lack of 
evidence on its impact, concluding that “P4P may be beneficial in some settings”.  
 
Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan argue these types of interventions fail to improve 
equity and quality of health services because they are developed in relation to an 
“imagined world rather than the world as it is” (Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan 
2003). Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan contend that in the real world there medicine 
in West Africa suffers from an “ethical deficit” that needs to be addressed. They 
argue this needs to be done not in the typical format of workshops or training, 
but rather through formal negotiations with both health workers and patients on 
site. They propose that in these negotiations, issues such as “funding, workforce, 
qualifications, but also the contempt in which patients are held, lack of professional 
conscience, lack of sanctions, not following procedure, lack of organization, 
absenteeism, corruption etc” need to be openly discussed in the “language of 
truth”, without using the “doublespeak that is so common in administrations and 
interactions with donors” (Jaffré and Olivier de Sardan 2003).  
 
In a recent editorial Olivier de Sardan and Ridde have argued that user fee 
exemptions are the latest in the long line of policies designed at the international 
level that fail to understand the real world of deep rooted causes ethical 
problems in health systems in West Africa (and perhaps elsewhere). Again, they 
call for more open and honest debate, pointing out that UHC policy documents 
remain silent on these issues despite the fact that these problems are informally 
recognized by policymakers (Olivier de Sardan and Ridde 2015, Ridde 2015). 
 
However, Olivier de Sardan and his colleagues’ insistence on combating 
“doublespeak” and corruption through negotiations that bring to light the “truth” 
is problematic. The critique of Sen discussed above (Deneulin and McGregor 
2010), of the “underestimation of the power that lies behind the meanings that can 
be brought to bear in such processes of public reasoning and deliberation” could 
also be levelled against Olivier de Sardan and the critical realist approach more 
generally.  
 
The social construction of corruption 
 
Our results highlight areas of ambiguity where a social constructionist lens may 
aid interpretation; for example to explain how in same breathe a person can 
denounce “long arm system” as self-interested and corrupt and simultaneously 
argue the “buddy system” as solidaristic, when from an outsider’s point of view, 
both practices could be defined as corrupt. Olivier de Sardan himself points out 
that there is a social and cultural logic of “normative pluralism” in everyday 
corruption between citizens and public officials in West Africa, characterized by 
a “fluidity and variety of both formal and informal rules” (Blundo and Olivier de 
Sardan 2006). Other anthropologists studying corruption in West Africa have 
also pointed to the plurality of interpretations at play. For example Smith (2007) 
finds that various types of apparent “corruption” in Nigeria were justified by 
people as a legitimate response to inequality, the only way to survive in a broken 
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system, or as morally upright, despite views of westerners to the contrary. In 
Senegal the “long arm system” and “buddy system” were similarly seen by many 
as the only way to survive in a broken health system – literally so, in the case of 
severe illness. Additionally, the “buddy system” was widely perceived as moral. 
Such research findings on the social construction of corruption are not purely an 
African phenomenon; in the literature on Europe, it has also been found that 
corruption cannot have a fixed definition because it is socially constructed 
(Tänzler, Maras et al. 2012). Granovetter (2007) has reviewed the sociological 
and anthropological literature on corruption from a variety of contexts and 
similarly concludes that corruption is it is not a “natural” fact but a social 
“factum”.  
 
Social constructionist philosophy thereby puts into question Olivier de Sardan’s 
aim of combating corruption by establishing “truth” or “reality” through open 
negotiation; it questions whether it would be possible, or even desirable, for all 
stakeholders in the PS system to agree on whether to definitively denounce the 
“long arm system” and “buddy system” as corrupt. Social constructionists such as 
Gergen whose ideas are expounded by Burr (2015) assert that truth claims can 
shut debates down, since they establish limits on what people can say. Relatively 
powerful actors’ versions of the truth are likely to prevail at the expense of 
others. The social constructionist lens therefore requires one to accept that in 
any negotiation, a plurality of realities will be in contest with each other. This 
suggests it is likely to be very difficult for all stakeholders in a health system or a 
health facility to agree on causal mechanisms of corruption and how these create 
social exclusion, and to change these practices. Yet from a social constructionist 
perspective, this is no reason not to engage in a debate; rather it is an excellent 
reason to have a debate. If one embraces this idea, it is still possible to promote 
the kind of open negotiation put forward Olivier de Sardan, or indeed the 
reasoning advocated by Sen, but without an expectation that an uncontested 
version of reality as regards the causes and consequences corruption in health 
care as regards user fee exemptions can be produced. This awareness may lead 
to the shifts in power relations and innovative culturally relevant and rooted 





This study identifies fifteen causes of inclusion in or exclusion from PS across the 
two qualitative datasets. These causes are grouped under four “parent” codes: PS 
as “a right”, “a privilege”, “a favour”, or “a curse”. The discussion seeks to 
reconcile these different causes and themes into a critical realist framework. The 
results are analysed through the lens of the capability approach to explain why 
possessing the right to access free health care (i.e. the PS policy) was of little use 
without having the means to access free health care (i.e. knowledge of this right, 
combined with the requisite level of state funding); and to explain why for many 
individuals, these means were also insufficient to actually achieve the end of 




The paper then draws on Kabeer’s framework of social exclusion to identify two 
possible underlying hidden generative mechanisms: mobilisation of institutional 
bias and social closure. The results are then situated in the wider anthropological 
and historical literature to argue that these mechanisms were the result of 
complex historical processes in Senegal, including the development of medical 
infrastructure and practical norms within a highly corrupt colonial and post-
colonial public bureaucracy. It is proposed that redressing social exclusion from 
PS would require an open debate about these multi-layered causes, since they 
are rarely acknowledged in Senegalese or international policy documents on 
expanding UHC and removing user charges.  
 
A social constructionist perspective is then employed to point out that an open 
debate would, however, be unlikely to reach a common version of the “truth” 
about the morals and ethics at play in the health system that was acceptable to 
all, but that this lack of consensus could be important for preventing relatively 
powerful actors’ versions of the truth from prevailing at the expense of others.    
 
It is understandable that the conceptually complex interpretation of evidence 
provided in this study is not commonly used in policy reports on UHC. The task 
of raising sufficient funding to provide publicly funded health services in Senegal 
and in LMIC more widely seems economically and politically challenging enough 
without muddying the water with wider social questions about local power 
relations and corruption, combined with epistemological and ontological 
questions about reality and discourse. Yet lack of attention to these issues may 
be one of the reasons why in Senegal, as elsewhere in SSA, UHC policies are not 
experiencing widespread success. Indeed, an important agenda for future 
research is to ascertain whether these causes of exclusion occur in other 
countries. Some aspects likely to be context specific but others may be common 
to many post-colonial countries transitioning from high levels of out-of-pocket 
spending to publicly funded UHC and free care at point of use, in a context of high 
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